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This draft working paper is to summarize theoretical contributions in the field of measuring 
systemic risk and contagion of financial systems. Broad theoretical framework is analysed and 
empiric approach to a macroeconomic model of global banking system systemic risk and 
contagion is offered. The model is to use BIS locational statistics as well as national consolidated 
balance sheets of banking systems to provide some insight into the vulnerability of modern 
banking system. As to theoretical contributions, three branches of literature are analysed: 
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1 This is merely a draft working paper, if you have any ideas to discuss or remarks to make please do not hesitate to 
contact me. My e-mail is snakers4@mail.ru. The empiric part of the paper is expected by end of August 2012. 
Financial contagion and systemic risk of global financial system: from theory to 
applicable macroeconomic model 
Definition of financial contagions 
 
What is financial contagion? And why is it correlated with the systemic risk of 
global financial system? How can we exactly measure and define such an intangible 
entity? What statistical and mathematical methods can we use to measure susceptibility 
of global financial system to inner and outer shocks? There are no clear straightforward 
answers to these ambiguous questions. Nevertheless it is worth trying to do it by 
employing vast arrays of empiric and theoretical literature on this topic. 
Kolb (2010) 2 advises that we should first of all consider the very nature of the 
metaphor used to describe this phenomenon. We should be fully aware of the fact that 
such notions as “epidemic” (which refers to financial crisis) and “contagion” are quite 
different. Not all crises or epidemics may be due to contagion. The main fundamental 
reason of contagion is the mechanism of transmission of contagion from one financial 
institution to another. Anticipating the following literature, it is worth noting that the vast 
majority of researchers in fact analyse the consequences of contagion, i.e. they study 
various episodes of increased correlation of financial indicators. Such an approach may 
provide us with a useful to tool for identifying contagious episodes post factum but it 
remains unclear what underlying mechanisms are involved. 
Let us return to the very notion of financial contagion. Different economists have 
various ideas about definition of contagion: 
1.  “The theory is that small shocks impacting several institutions or sectors are then 
spread to the whole financial sector of economy by means of  contagion3”; 
2. “The spread of problems in financial sphere from one economy to another in one 
region or globally, which can be called contagion4”; 
Some provide more complex definitions of contagion: 
1. Increase in probability of crisis in one country due to occurrence of crisis in other 
countries; 
                                               
2 Financial contagion: the viral threat to the wealth of nations / RobertW. Kolb, editor, ISBN 978-0-470-92238-5. 
3 Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale. 2000. “Financial Contagion,” Journal of Political Economy 
108:1, 1–33. 
4 Caramazza, Francesco, Luca Ricci, and Ranil Salgado. 2004. “International Financial Contagion in Currency 
Crises.” Journal of International Money and Finance 23:51–70. 
2. “Spill over” of volatility from one country to another; 
3. Contagion occurs when correlated stock price movements cannot be explained by 
fundamentals; 
4. Contagion is a significant increase in covariance between prices and volumes in 
different markets, which happens as a result of crisis; 
5. Contagion occurs when transmission channel is amplified after a shock on one of 
markets. 
For some researchers the speed of contagion is what matters. But for the majority 
of economists the very notion of contagion is equivalent to increase in correlation 
between studied markets. There are several specific concerns: 
 
1. As a rule, during crises volatility is usually seen to rise which causes increase in 
correlations. Therefore researchers employ sophisticated econometric and statistic 
apparatus; 
2. The correlation level must be higher “than is explained by the fundamentals” of  “than 
was expected”; 
3. Lack of proper proof of contagion (i.e. stable high correlation) is interpreted as inter-
dependence; 
Channels of contagion 
 
It is useful to know during which episodes (the majority of researchers agree that 
contagion took place during Asian financial crisis and the crisis of 2007-2008) took place 
and to have certain metrics to track it. But in order to shape sensible counteraction policy 
we are to know the mechanisms of transmission, which can possibly act as means of 
contagion.  We can even point to one popular metaphor5: “when America sits in a 
draught, the rest of the world catches cold”. The following channels are widely agreed to 
be applicable in this case: 
 
 Trade (during crisis import of the affected country can decrease impacting the 
rest of the world); 
 Direct and portfolio investment; 
                                               
5 At least in Russia. 
 International liabilities between (or “balance sheet effect”, we can actually 
extend B. Bernanke’s financial accelerator theory to international scale6); 
 The existence of marked to market assets on the balance sheets of banks may 
lead to fire price sales during crises, which may result in capital deficiency. 
Margin calls may also be an issue; 
 Change in the perception mechanism of investors, i.e. so called wake-up calls 
when unanticipated negative events changes investors’ outlook. Also sometimes 
investors are known to treat all emerging economies as the whole, which 
influences their judgment heavily; 
 Significant uncertainty issues, unreliability of conventional statistical and 
mathematical methods during turbulence periods; 
 
The first three channels are quite fundamental (also trade and BOP have long and 
reliable series of data). These fundamental connection channels can be analysed using 
network models and calculation widely accepted network metrics. This was done 
extensively only for trade network. 
Correlation analysis of contagion 
 
The bulk part of research dedicated to contagion is based on correlation metrics. 
They usually do not dwell on analysing the channels of transmission. 
In particular researchers from Bank of Italy7 summarize a few useful stylized facts 
about financial crises and contagion: 
 
 Drastic asset price changes affect clusters of countries; 
 Volatility of asset yields is higher during crises; 
 During crises covariance of asset yields is known to rise within one country; 
 Correlations between assets from different countries also rise; 
 
                                               
6 Bernanke, B. & Gertler, M. & Gilchrist, S., 1998. "The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle 
Framework," Working Papers 98-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. 
7 GIANCARLO CORSETTI, MARCELLO PERICOLI, MASSIMO SBRACIA, 2010, “Correlation Analysis of 
Financial Contagion”, Bank of Italy working paper. 
Nevertheless, researchers claim that increase in correlation must be sufficient to 
identify contagious episode. Also we find IMF research 8  testing new contagion 
distribution channel of very high interest. Researchers test hypothesis that uncertainty 
(measured as variation of 1 year GDP forecasts) is correlated with crisis type. They 
divide crises into “surprise” events (Thailand, Russia and Mexico) and expected events 
(Brazil, Argentina, Turkey). It turns out that surprise crises have a robust positive effect 
on uncertainty level, i.e. it grows after crisis. Expected crises on the other hand decrease 
the level of uncertainty. Researchers claim that these findings are dataset and 
methodology robust. Also by employing logit-models they find that the uncertainty itself 
has a positive effect on crisis probability. Therefore uncertainty can act as a self-fulfilling 
mechanism of crisis transmission to a certain extend.  But how the invisible contagion 
transmission method works? The following mechanism is suggested: 
 Some event occurs which undermines faith in traditional informational 
institutions; 
 Uncertainty grows; 
 Visible reliability of traditional analysis methods declines, information quality 
declines; 
 Consequently investment in some sphere (or country or sector) decreases; 
 Then there is a positive loop of uncertainty; 
 Eventually it may facilitate crisis; 
It is worth noting that this mechanism of transmission (combined with balance 
sheet effects and margin calls) is in fact equivalent to financial accelerator on global scale. 
Billio, Getmansky 9  et.al. (2010) offer another approach to measuring inter-
dependence of markets. The first step of their estimation is calculating a system of 
simultaneous equations, which have GARCH-based ideology. This system of equations 
accounts for changes in volatility due to its lagged values and for dependence of volatility 
between different markets. Then fitted values are subtracted from real values and the 
dataset acquired as a result of this operation is searched for correlation. In the end, they 
offer 2 indexes measuring correlation growth strength in the dataset (for 1995-2005).  
                                               
8 Prakash Kannan and Fritzi Köhler-Geib, 2009, “The Uncertainty Channel of Contagion”,  IMF Working paper 
WP/09/219. 
9 Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon, 2010, “Measuring Systemic Risk in the 
Finance and Insurance Sectors”, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4774-10. 
According to their metrics, they identify 3 contagious episodes – Asian crisis, 2001 and 
2003.  
Kleimer, Lehnert,Verschoor (2008) 10 go even further and depart from assumption 
that contagion (when it is existent) occurs instantly and analyse not close prices but time-
aligned data. Such approach allows them to operate on really small time-frames (minutes). 
Researchers analyse 2 crisis events (Thailand and Hong-Kong) and conclude contagion 
occurred between Thailand and Australia, Hong-Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore. It is worth noting that synchronized data (close period data) show contagion 
only between Thailand and Indonesia. The same observations may be derived from 
Hong-Kong episode. 
Some researchers approach this issue from institutional point of view11  and claim 
the existing system of regulation and risk dissemination to be inadequate. Their primary 
concerns are the following: 
 Inefficiency or regulating banking entities; 
 Lack of transparency when it comes to valuing assets of financial institutions; 
 Uncertainty due to inexistence of unified asset valuation techniques; 
 Moral hazard connected with corporate governance and deposit insurance; 
 Lack of  clear government policy regarding bankruptcy of significant financial 
institutions; 
Network analysis of contagion 
 
All the aforementioned usually refers to analysing financial contagion indirectly, 
i.e. analysing its symptoms. If we continue to use the contagion metaphor, then we need 
not only to only to identify the infection and its epicentre, but also invent a means of 
preventing such infections in future.  Therefore we will turn to more fundamental disease 
spread channels. As discussed before we take the following channels into consideration: 
 Trade; 
 Capital account; 
                                               
10 Kleimeier, S., T. Lehnert, and W. Verschoor. 2008. “Measuring Financial Contagion Using Time-Aligned Data: 
The Importance of the Speed of Transmission of Shocks.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 70:4, 493–
508 
11 Østrup, Finn, Lars Oxelheim, and ClasWihlborg. 2009. “Origins and Resolution of Financial Crises; Lessons from 
the Current and Northern European Crises.” Asian Economic Papers 8:3, 2009. 
 Bank liabilities; 
Detailed analysis is usually conducted using network models. Kubelec and Sa 
(2010) gathered a vast array of bi-directional data for 18 developed economies from 1980 
to 2005 (direct investment, portfolio investment, debt, official reserves). Their main 
conclusions are the following: the financial network is getting more and more dense, its 
central nodes are the USA and Great Britain. Also they observe increase in connectivity 
of financial and trade network.  The distributions of trade and finance connections have 
long tails, which implies the existence of core-periphery structure. Average path length 
also decreases. 
Hattori and Suda (2007) analysed stocks of banks’ claims to each other for 215 
countries from 1985 to 2006. Their conclusion is that the network is getting more 
connected and clustered. Also they find that during such shocks as the LTCM collapse 
and the Asian crisis the structure of the network does not change. This is an important 
milestone of thinking about a useful empirical model of crises. 
Allan and Gale (2000) in their fundamental monograph drew attention to 
importance of banking system concentration.  They utilize a very stylized banking system 
model in order to show that high level of connectivity in banking system may foster risk 
diversification. Nier, Yorulmazer and Alentorn (2008) employ more sophisticated 
mathematical modelling in order to show that higher capital ratio decreases probability of 
default in banking system in a non-linear fashion.  Researchers generate hypothetic 
banking network using mathematical modelling and then subject it to outer shocks. If 
shock is smaller than equity capital of the bank then it’s absorbed. If the shock is bigger, 
then it is transmitted to other banks and depositors, which can cause further amplification. 
Probability of bank default also depends on the foreign claims ratio (which varies from 
15% to 30%). It reaches maximum when this ratio is about 30% and then is stable.  The 
link between the number of nodes in the network (i.e. how full the network is) and the 
number of defaults is m-shaped. It means that there are few defaults in case of little 
connections and few defaults in case of abundant connections. The most useful about this 
paper is its approach for modelling banking networks, shock absorption and transmission 
mechanisms. This will be adopted by us empirically in future. 
Fagiolo, Reyses and Shiavo (2010) 12  provide a significant contribution by 
analysing world trade network. Their findings include:  
 Network has core-periphery structure; 
 Major role is played by OECD countries; 
 The structure of the network is quite stable and is not susceptible to systemic 
shocks; 
 High involvement in trade network increases the probability of stock market 
shock during crisis events.  
But the most interesting contribution is provided in IMF paper by Minoiu and 
Reyes (2011) 13  analysing the financial network of flows of banking claims (BIS 
locational statistics). Their database contains quarterly data for 184 countries from 1978 
to 2009. Bank claims include loans, deposits, obligations and other assets. One 
aforementioned paper had almost the same database, but they analysed stocks of claims, 
which are by definition less volatile and representative (they found the banking network 
to be quite stable). In contrast with previous findings, banking flows network appear to 
be very volatile and have certain interesting properties to be outlined. Minuiu and Reyes 
analyse 15 lenders and 169 borrowers, which is a dictated by BIS’s structure of data.  
Researchers use the following conventional metrics stemming from graph theory: 
node degree (number of connections for each country), node strength (sum of inflows or 
outflows for a given node), relative node strength, connectivity (total number of non-zero 
connections divided by their potential number) and several clustering metrics. 
During 3 decades the financial network underwent several waves of financial 
globalization. Figure 1 depicts the dynamics of main network metrics. We can clearly see 
3 ways of financial globalization on the chart. The first wave ends with debt crisis of 
early 80s. The second one ends with the Asian financial crisis. The third wave of 
connectivity growth in GBN (Global Banking Network) ends with the crisis of 2007-
2008. Authors also confirm that the network is quite volatile by using empirical 
distribution tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests).  
 
 
                                               
12 Fagiolo, G., Reyes, J., and S. Schiavo, 2010, “The evolution of the world trade web: A weighted network 
analysis,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 20(4), pp. 479‒514 
13 Camelia Minoiu, Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2009”, IMF Working 
Paper WP/11/74. 



















Source: Camelia Minoiu, Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2009”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/74 
 
 










Source: Camelia Minoiu, Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2009”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/74 
 
It is also interesting that in a recent paper by Stolbov (2012) 14 the existence of 
credit cycles in global economy is also confirmed using quite different statistical and 
mathematical apparatus. 
The main interest is behaviour of GBN during crises. Take a look at the figure 2 
depicting the following crises: the 1987 stock crash, Scandinavian banking crises of 
1991-1992,  British currency crisis of 1992-199315,  LTCM collapse in Q3 1998, the 
Internet bubble collapse in 2000, the demise of Lehman Brothers in Q3 2008. Authors 
claim that many connections “die out” after crises and connectivity metrics decrease. It 
can be seen even more clearly for Latin America and Eastern Asia. Authors also measure 
average connectivity levels before and after crises and state that crises lead to decrease in 
connectivity metrics. Inclusion of 2007-2008 crisis amplifies this effect (see figure 3). 
 









Source: Camelia Minoiu, Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2009”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/74 
 
 
Analysis is finalized with dummy-based regression model showing that credit is 




                                               
14 Stolbov, Mikhail, International Credit Cycles: A Regional Perspective (April 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037352 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2037352. 
15 A notorious episode earning G. Soros £1bn. 
Other methods 
 
 Analysis of systemic risk is a separate and broad issue in the literature. By 
definition systemic risk is a situation when there is a probability that a series of connected 
defaults in the financial system happening during a short time period can decrease 
liquidity and result in confidence loss. “Systemic crisis can be defined as a systemic 
event, which influences many financial institutions undermining normal functioning of 
the financial system. While the special nature of banking institutions plays its role, 
systemic risk is something more than banks’ vulnerability to runs. The notion of financial 
contagion lies at the root of this concept. In this case contagion means significant spill 
over of losses from one institution or market to another.” 16 
 The events of 2007-2009 show us that in the modern economy such phenomena 
(so called “bank runs”) can extend not only on traditional banking institutions but also on 
insurance companies, hedge funds, non-banking credit facilities and broker/dealer 
companies via a network of connections between them. Systemic risk can be adequately 




 Losses ; 
A paper by Billio, Getmansky, Lo et.al. (2010) uses market yields of public 
companies as a proxy of their operational success in order to measure linkages between 
them. They analyse a vast array of banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and broker 
companies.  
The main pillars of systemic risk are leverage and linkages. Leverage acts as a 
magnifying glass, which enlarges losses during adverse market conditions. As financial 
companies usually have only limited amount of equity capital, they have to sell assets 
during crises which causes negative feedback loops. Also assets of financial institutions 
may be quite illiquid (i.e. hedge funds) and lack stable market valuation, which in its turn 
aggravates the situation. Also the depth of crisis may depend on how asset price is 
susceptible to market conditions and how companies are interlinked. 
                                               
16 De Bandt, Olivier, and Philipp Hartmann, 2000, “Systemic Risk: A Survey,” European Central Bank Working 
Paper No. 35. 
In practice data on mutual debt exposures turns out to be proprietary and 
inaccessible to regulators in most of cases. Therefore systemic risk analysis is frequently 
conducted using indirect measures. Indirect systemic risk analysis may be useful for 
crisis prevention if it is based on relevant data. Thus, researchers employ market data 
assuming that market valuation should react quickly to adverse market conditions. In any 
case, if financial companies provided such data to regulators, it could be doubted that 
regulators would act efficiently. In this case we can remember about criticism towards 
recent Dodd-Frank law17. 
Researchers note that they chose these types of financial institutions deliberately 
taking into consideration the changes the global financial system underwent recently. 
Literature on systemic risk can be divided in several broad categories.  
The first type of literature deals with contagion on micro level within banking 
system and studies linkages between bank defaults, bank profitability and amounts of 
direct losses. Also direct financial links between banks, which can incur losses, are 
considered.  
The second category studies fluctuations of aggregated banking credit activity, 
banking crises and booms. Such studies usually also utilize banks’ financial ratios and 
volumes of liabilities. The main result is that fundamental macroeconomic factors can 
actually significantly affect the performance of banking system.  
 The third group of systemic risk studies uses correlation metrics as a yardstick, 
which was already covered. A paper by Billio, Getmansky, Lo et.al. (2010) use a variety 
of approaches: 
1. Autocovariance 18  and correlation analysis of aggregated indexes for each 
financial sector; 
2. PCA; 
3. Granger causality tests; 
4. Analysis of linkages between 25 biggest institutions in each sector; 
Figure 4 depicts aggregated 36-month autocovariances of sector indexes. During 
crises autocovariance is seen to rise. Figure 5 depicts pair correlations between 
aggregated indexes and figure 6 illustrated PCA for these indexes.  All this charts show 
that systemic fragility and risk is mounting before and during major crises.  
                                               
17 http://www.economist.com/node/21547784 
18 Existence of autocovariances of index returns is treated as a proxy of market inefficiency. 














Source: Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon, 2010, “Measuring Systemic 
Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors”, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4774-10. 
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Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors”, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4774-10. 

















Source:  Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon, 2010, “Measuring Systemic Risk 
in the Finance and Insurance Sectors”, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4774-10. 
 
 
It is also worth noting that causality links between 100 top institutions from 4 
sectors were analysed. Researchers found that the number of statistically significant links 
between institutions rose from 6% to 14% (of maximal number of links).  Also figure 7 




























Source: Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon, 2010, “Measuring Systemic Risk in 
the Finance and Insurance Sectors”, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4774-10. 
 
Sketch of applicable macroeconomic model of contagion 
 
The following model of systemic risk and contagion in global financial system 
(GFS) is to be implemented. It owes its main building blocks to the above literature. It 
was decided to limit our analysis solely to banking sector and exclude trade and capital 
movements. Key premises for such decision are the following: 
 
 BIS collects detailed data on banking systems of various countries on unified 
basis; 
 Such banking network is described in literature in detail; 
 Central banks provide consolidated balance sheets of their banking systems; 
 Researchers point out that banks play pivotal yet not overwhelming role in 
crises; 
 Data on connection and assets of banking systems allows us to validate the 
potential “threat” and “cushion” to mitigate this threat; 
 When current or capital account poses threat to GDP in the long term it is less 
clear how  “cushion” mechanism works; 
 Banking data is more frequent (quarterly) and can serve in theory as leading 
indicator; 
 Author’s limited capabilities. 
 
Ideologically the model will look as follows: 
 Using data of central banks we construct stylized consolidated  banking 
balances (main entries are equity, foreign assets/liabilities, deposits); 
 BIS network data is added; 
 Also balance sheets of top 3 largest institutions per country can be added to 
analysis; 
 Fragmentation of banking system can be evaluated using concentration metrics 
(HHI, CR3 etc); 
 We take the assumption that foreign shock occur due to the fact that financial 
links between countries’ banks die out during crises causing losses  (now 
“candidates” are Spain, Portugal and Greece); 
 Such shocks are first cushioned using equity capital, then using international 
assets (which may cause secondary induced defaults and shocks) and only then 
using deposits; 
 Model including balance sheets and network will be subjected to shock via 
mathematical modeling; 
 
In perfect world such model can be a useful applied instrument to spot problem 
financial zones and evaluate consequences of financial turmoil.  
 






















Source: Camelia Minoiu, Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2009”, IMF Working Paper WP/11/74 
Conclusion 
 
This article summarized different approaches to studying financial contagion and 
systemic risk. A sketch of applied macroeconomic model was proposed.  The next 
iteration of this paper will include empirical analysis and model evaluation. 
The analysis of systemic risk and financial contagion is a relatively new and 
developing topic. Usually different statistical and mathematical methods are applied, but 
researchers agree on one thing: we require adequate and timely methods to monitor 
financial system in order to react on mounting fragility in the system.  Also we believe 
that in the modern world, to which very intertwined financial system is inherent, such 
analysis should become mainstream. But in this case we are to develop simple and 
intuitively understandable instruments. It is obvious that systems of simultaneous 
GARCH equations are not easy understood by the public. Therefore we will also try to 
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